Abstract. The folk result in Kyle-Back models states that the value function of the insider remains unchanged when her admissible strategies are restricted to absolutely continuous ones. In this paper we show that, for a large class of pricing rules used in current literature, the value function of the insider can be finite when her strategies are restricted to be absolutely continuous and infinite when this restriction is not imposed. This implies that the folk result doesn't hold for those pricing rules and that they are not consistent with equilibrium. We derive the necessary conditions for a pricing rule to be consistent with equilibrium and prove that, when a pricing rule satisfies these necessary conditions, the insider's optimal strategy is absolutely continuous, thus obtaining the classical result in a more general setting.
Introduction
The canonical model of markets with asymmetric information is due to Kyle [17] , where he studies a market for a single risky asset whose price is determined in equilibrium. Kyle's model is set up in discrete time and it has been extended to a continuous time framework by Back [1] and is commonly referred to as a Kyle-Back model in subsequent literature. In this type of models there are typically three types of agents participating in the market: non-strategic noise traders, a strategic risk-neutral informed trader (insider) with private information regarding the future value of the asset, and a number of risk-neutral market makers competing for the total demand. The goal of market makers is to set the pricing rule so that the resulting price is rational, which in particular entails finite expected profit for the insider trading at these prices. On the other hand, the objective of the insider is to maximise her expected final wealth given the pricing rule set by the market makers. Thus, this type of modelling can be viewed as a game with asymmetric information between the market makers and the insider and the goal is to find an equilibrium of this game.
Apart from extending the Kyle's model to continuous time the most important contribution of Back [1] was to establish that, when the market maker sets the price to be a harmonic function of total order, the insider's value function is finite and the optimal control solving the insider's optimisation problem is absolutely continuous. This implies that the set of admissible controls of the insider can be reduced to absolutely continuous ones. This restriction significantly simplifies the problem of finding an equilibrium since it allows one to employ a Date: December 19, 2018.
1 PDE approach to the insider's optimal control problem that yields a system of PDEs that the value function of the insider and the pricing rule of the market maker have to satisfy in equilibrium.
Back's result was the original justification for restricting the set of admissible controls of the insider to absolutely continuous ones and this restriction is now standard in the asymmetric information literature (see, e.g., [2] , [10] , [11] , [5] , [8] , [13] , [12] , and [18] ). In this paper we show that if we extend the class of pricing rules beyond harmonic functions of total order to include ones used in the recent literature, e.g. in the papers cited above, then the value function of the insider is infinite and her optimal control is not absolutely continuous. In particular, this is true for the pricing rules in the aforementioned papers. Since the value function of the insider is infinite, those pricing rules can not be equilibrium pricing rules.
However, since the infinite profit is due to penalty imposed on discontinuous strategies or strategies with additional martingale part being insufficient to offset the profit made due to private information, one can modify this penalty to ensure optimality of absolutely continuous strategies, while warranting the same price process when insider's strategy is absolutely continuous. This is precisely what we do in this paper by establishing a class of pricing rules that yield the same price process as the models cited before when the trading strategy of the insider is absolutely continuous but produce a finite value for the insider when her strategies are allowed to have jumps or martingale parts. We show that for this class of pricing rules the set of admissible controls of the insider can be reduced to absolutely continuous ones.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to identify this class of pricing rules consistent with an equilibrium. Moreover, it is also the first one since [1] that justifies the restriction of insider's controls to absolutely continuous ones in a general setting. In this it closes the gap between the assumption of absolutely continuous controls and its justification in the modern literature that employs more general pricing rules.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and introduce the set of pricing rules that generalise the pricing rules employed in the current literature. In Section 3 we analyse the optimisation problem of the insider and establish a subset of these pricing rules that yield a finite value to this problem. In particular, Theorem 3.2 derives the necessary conditions on the pricing rule that ensure that the insider cannot achieve infinite profits by employing discontinuous strategies and/or strategies with a martingale part. Theorem 3.4 establishes a PDE condition on the pricing rule that is necessary for the existence of equilibrium. In Section 4 we demonstrate that, under the conditions for the pricing rule derived in Section 3, the restriction of admissible controls to absolutely continuous ones produces the same value function. Moreover, as a by-product we obtain the familiar sufficient conditions on the pricing rule and the trading strategy in order for the equilibrium to exist.
Model setup
As in [1] we will assume that the trading will take place over the time interval [0, 1] . Let (Ω, G, (G t ) t∈ [0, 1] , Q) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions, The time-1 value of the traded asset is given by f (Z 1 ), which will become public knowledge at t = 1 to all market participants, where Z is a continuous and adapted process, and f is a measurable increasing function.
Three types of agents trade in the market. They differ in their information sets and objectives as follows.
• Noise/liquidity traders trade for liquidity reasons, and their total demand at time t is given by a standard (G t )-Brownian motion B independent of Z.
• Market makers only observe the total demand
where θ is the demand process of the informed trader. The admissibility condition imposed later on θ will entail in particular that Y is a semimartingale.
They set the price of the risky asset via a Bertrand competition and clear the market. Similar to [2] we assume that the market makers set the price as a function of weighted total order process at time t, i.e. we consider pricing functionals S Y [0,t] , t of the following form
where X is adapted to the filtration generated by B and Z and is the unique strong solution of a certain SDE whose coefficients and drivers are constructed by the market makers as made precise in Definition 2.1. Moreover, a pricing rule has to be admissible in the sense of Definition 2.1, which will entail S being a semimartingale.
• The informed investor observes the price process S t = H (t, X t ) and her private signal Z. Since she is risk-neutral, her objective is to maximize the expected final wealth, i.e.
In above A is the set of admissible trading strategies for the given pricing rule 1 observable by the insider, which will be defined in Definition 2.2. Moreover, E 0,z is the expectation with respect to P 0,z , which is the regular conditional distribution of (X s , Z s ; s ≤ 1) given X 0 = 0 and Z 0 = z, which exists due to Theorem 44.3 in [4] .
Thus, the insider maximises the expected value of her final wealth W θ 1 , where the first term on the right hand side of equation (2.2) is the contribution to the final wealth due to a potential differential between the market price and the fundamental value at the time of information release, and the second term is the contribution to the final wealth coming from the trading activity. Given the above market structure, we can now precisely define the filtrations of the market makers and of the informed trader. As we shall require them to satisfy the usual conditions, we first define the probability measures that will be used in the completion of their filtrations. 1 Note that this implies the insider's optimal trading strategy takes into account the feedback effect, i.e. that prices react to her trading strategy.
First define F := σ(B t , Z t ; t ≤ 1) and let Q 0,z be the regular conditional distribution of (B, Z) given B 0 = 0 and Z 0 = z. Observe that any P 0,z -null set is also Q 0,z -null in view of the assumption on X. Due to the measurability of regular conditional distributions one can define the probability measure P on (Ω, F ) by
for any E ∈ F . While Q 0,z is how the informed trader assign likelihood to the events generated by B and Z, P is the probability distribution of the market makers who do not observe Z 0 exactly. Thus, the market makers' filtration, denoted by F M , will be the right-continuous augmentation with the P-null sets of the filtration generated by Y . In particular F M satisfies the usual conditions.
On the other hand, since the informed trader knows the value of Z 0 perfectly, it is plausible to assume that her filtration is augmented with the Q 0,z -null sets. However, this will make the modelling cumbersome since the filtration will have an extra dependence on the value of Z 0 purely for technical reasons. Another natural choice is to consider the null sets that belong to every Q 0,z , i.e. the sets that are elements of the following
These null sets will correspond to the a priori beliefs that the informed trader has about the model before she is given the private information about Z 0 and, thus, can be used as a good benchmark for comparison. Therefore we assume that the informed trader's filtration, denoted by F I , is the right continuous augmentation of the filtration generated by S and Z with the sets of N I . Note that the resulting filtration is not complete. We are finally in a position to give a rigorous definition of the rational expectations equilibrium of this market, i.e. a pair consisting of an admissible pricing rule and an admissible trading strategy such that: a) given the pricing rule the trading strategy is optimal, b) given the trading strategy, the pricing rule is rational in the following sense: 6) where E corresponds to the expectation operator under P. To formalize this definition of equilibrium, we first define the sets of admissible pricing rules and trading strategies.
Definition 2.
1. An admissible pricing rule is any pair (H, w, c, j) fulfilling the following conditions:
2) Given a Brownian motion, β, on some filtered probability space, there exists a unique strong solution to dX t = w(t,X t )dβ t ,X 0 = 0.
Suppose that (H, w, c, j) is an admissible pricing rule and the market makers face the total demand, Y = B + θ, where θ is an admissible trading strategy in the sense of Definition 2.2. Then the price set by the market makers is S t = H(t, X t ), where X is the unique strong solution 2 of dX t = w(t, X t− )dY
Note that in view of Definition 2.1 the set of admissible θ for which there exists a strong solution to (2.7) is not empty.
Moreover, if θ is absolutely continuous, dX t = w(t, X t )dY t and the price set by the market makers agrees with the one set in the standard literature. That is, the choice of c and j does not affect the market price if the insider's trading strategy is restricted to be absolutely continuous. This implies that (2.7) defines a set of pricing rules for general strategies of the insider that are consistent with the ones used in the literature under the assumption that the insider is only allowed to follow absolutely continuous strategies. Thus, if one can identify the functions c and j for which the optimal strategy of the insider is absolutely continuous, one recovers the equilibria obtained in the previous studies with the modification of the pricing rule given by those c and j.
Remark 2.1. Observe that the existence of a unique strong solution in Definition 2.1 implies
for some large enough n. On the other hand, application of Ito's formula yields
Thus, the law of
Remark 2.2. The strict monotonicity of H in the space variable implies H is invertible prior to time 1, thus, the filtration of the insider is generated by X and Z. Note that jumps of Y can be inferred from the jumps of X via (2.7) and the form of J. Moreover, since K w ∈ C 1,2 under the hypothesis on w, an application of Ito's formula yields
Thus, one can also obtain the dynamics of Y c by observing X. Hence, the natural filtrations of X and Y coincide. This in turn implies that (F S,Z t ) = (F B,Z t ), i.e. the insider has full information about the market.
In view of the above one can take
Definition 2.2. An F B,Z -adapted θ is said to be an admissible trading strategy for a given pricing rule (H, w, c, j
There exists a unique strong solution, X, to (2.7) over the time interval
, where Y = B + θ; (3) and no doubling strategies are allowed, i.e. for all z ∈ R
The set of admissible trading strategies for the given pricing rule (H, w, c, j) is denoted with A(H, w, c, j). For the notational brevity, we will also denote by A(H, w) := A(H, w, 0, 0).
Remark 2.3.
Observe that the jumps of θ are summable since θ is a semimartingale in a Brownian filtration and, thus, the local martingale in its decomposition is continuous. This in particular implies that that Y is a semimartingale with summable jumps and the price process is well-defined.
Now we can formally define the market equilibrium as follows.
, and the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Market efficiency condition: given θ * , (H * , w * , c * , j * ) is a rational pricing rule, i.e. it satisfies (2.6).
(2) Insider optimality condition: given (H * , w * , c * , j * ), θ * solves the insider optimization problem for all z:
The above setup uses the standard definition of equilibirum as in Back [1] . The difference lies in the generalisation of the set of admissible pricing rules that in particular includes the ones used in the current literature (see, e.g., [2] , [10] , [11] , [5] , [8] , [13] , [12] , and [18] ). Moreover, the signal of the insider is not assumed to be Markovian contrary to the common assumption.
On equilibrium pricing rule
In this section we will show that (2.7) is a necessary condition for the pricing rule to be compatible with the equilibrium, since any other choice of market maker's weighting of the signal will result in the infinite profit for the insider.
In what follows we will assume that H and w satisfy
where g is a continuous function. These PDEs (with g ≡ 0) can be obtained via a formal derivation of HJB equations associated with the insider optimisation problem as in [5] and [9] . We will demonstrate that w must satisfy (3.1) with g ≡ 0 for the equilibrium to exist 4 . The next theorem computes the expected final wealth of the insider in our general setup. We will use this representation to solve the optimisation problem for the insider. In particular this representation will provide an upper bound on the value function when g vanishes and the trading strategies are continuous. 
where
and ξ(t, a) is the unique solution of H(t, ξ(t, a)) = a. Moreover,
Proof. Using Ito's formula for general semimartingales (see, e.g. Theorem II.32 in [19] ) we obtain
If the equilibrium is inconspicuous as in most of the literature, the stated PDE for H will follow from the standard filtering theory.
where F V is of finite variation. Therefore,
Moreover, integrating (2.3) by parts (see Corollary 2 of Theorem II.22 in [19] ) we get
since the jumps of θ are summable. Moreover, direct calculations lead to
Ito's formula in conjunction with above yields
Combining the above and (3.6) and noting that the stochastic integral with respect to B is a true martingale we deduce
Note that since w is positive and H is increasing, we have
Similarly,
Remark 3.1. The representation of the expected profit given by the above theorem shows that the absolutely continuous strategies deliver expected wealth bounded by
has a finite value, the value function of the insider is also bounded when she is restricted to use absolutely continuous strategies. In what follows we will impose conditions sufficient for this to hold.
In view of the above remark we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. For every z ∈ R there exists an x ∈ R such that
Under this assumption we show below that the insider achieves infinite profits unless the pricing rule penalises the jumps and martingale parts correctly. The assumptions on the random variable f (Z 1 ) are quite general and are satisfied in the available literature. In particular they are satisfied in a large class of diffusion models. The condition that c = j = 0, however, is not satisfied in the available literature unless w is constant. Proof. Suppose c(t, x) = 0 for some t < 1 and x. Since c is continuous, there exist ν 1 < ν 2 < 1 and
. Moreover, by the continuity of K −1 w there exists t 1 < t 2 < 1 and
We shall construct a continuous trading strategy to achieve arbitrarily large profits for some realisation of Z 1 . This construction will be done in three stages. The first stage will utilise Lemma A.1 to bring X inside [K Observe that for any continuous semimartingale θ and G(t, x) := x 0 g(t, y)dy
Stage 1: To obtain a bounded X ε satisfying K w (t 1 , X ε t 1 ) ∈ (y 1 , y 2 ) apply Lemma A.1 to
and observe that pathwise uniqueness holds until the exit time from (y 1 , y 2 ) since c is locally Lipschitz and K
−1
w is continuously differentiable. Thus, if we can show the existence of a weak solution that never exits (y 1 , y 2 ), we will arrive at a strong solution that stays in (y 1 , y 2 ). Indeed, since c(t, K −1 w (t, x)) is bounded for all (t, x) ∈ (t 1 , t 2 ) ×(y 1 , y 2 ), by means of Girsanov transformation, weak solutions of above are the same as those of 9) which are unique in law and never exit (y 1 , y 2 ) by Proposition 3.1 in [7] . Define X t := K −1 w (t, R t ) and observe that
Stage 3: Finally consider the interval (t 2 , 1]. Apply Lemma A.1 to x(t) = X t 2 and ε as before to get |X ε | and set X = X ε . Observe that X constructed above is bounded by a determinstic constant, which in turn implies the boundedness of H(t, X t ). Thus, θ ∈ A(H, w, c, j). Recall from Theorem 3.1 that
since H and K w are increasing functions. Since X is bounded and (3.8) holds, we deduce
Also observe that
Thus, for some constant ℓ 2 (z) independent of b due to Assumption 3.1 and X taking values in a bounded interval,
Therefore,
where the constants m and M such that mM > 0 and M ≥ −
c(t, X t )dt ≥ m exist due to the continuity of c, boundedness of X and that c(t, X t ) is bounded away from 0 on [t 1 , t 2 ] by construction.
Observe that the coefficient of b 2 in above can be made positive for large enough z (resp. small enough z) if m > 0 (resp. if M < 0) due to our assumption on the random variable f (Z 1 ). This implies that insider's wealth can be made arbitrarily large for such z by making b arbitrarily large. This yields the claim that c must be 0 for insider's profit to be finite.
Next, suppose c ≡ 0, but j(t, x, κ) = 0 for some t < 1 and x, κ. Without loss of generality, assume j(t, x, κ) > 0 (the proof in the case j(t, x, κ) < 0 is similar). Since j is continuous, there exist t 1 < t 2 < 1, x 1 < x 2 , and κ 1 < κ 2 such that j(t, x, κ) > δ for some δ > 0 on
We will construct a strategy that achieves an arbitrarily large profit for some realisations of Z 1 . This will be again done in three stages: first, we will bring X inside the interval [x 1 , x 2 ] at time t 1 via Lemma A.1. On the interval [t 1 , t 2 ] we will construct a process with an arbitrary number of jumps each of which will give positive contribution to the final utility. Finally, we will keep X in the interval [x 1 , x 2 ] after time t 2 .
Fix 0 < ε <
Stage 1: On the interval [0, t 1 ) let x(t) = x 1 +x 2 2t 1 t and apply Lemma A.1 with ε as above to obtain a bounded process X such that X t 1 − ∈ (x 1 , x 2 ). The associated θ ε will be used as insider's strategy on [0, t 1 ). Stage 2: Next, we iteratively construct the process of jumps on [t 1 , t 2 ].
To this end, consider s i = t 1 + i t 2 −t 1 n , for i = 0, n and set θ t 1 = θ s 0 = θ s 0 − + κ 1 . Observe that j(s 0 , X s 0 − , κ 1 ) > δ, and
Suppose we already constructed the process θ (and X) on [0, s i ] and i < n, then on the interval (s i , s i+1 ) consider x(t) = X s i + x 1 +x 2 2 −Xs i s i+1 −s i (t − s i ) and apply Lemma A.1 with ε as above. Similar to Stage 1 the associated θ ε will be used as the trading strategy and X satisfies X s i+1 − ∈ [x 1 , x 2 ]. Finally, for i < n−1, set θ s i+1 = θ s i+1 − +κ 1 .
We again obtain j(s i+1 , X s i+1 − , κ 1 ) > δ, and by using x(t) =
with the same ε. Thus, we constructed a process θ and X with n jumps such that [θ, θ] c ≡ 0 and X is taking values in (m, M) for some m < M. Since X is bounded, H(t, X t ) is also bounded and therefore θ ∈ A(H, w, c, j). Moreover, due to Theorem 3.1, (3.4) and the fact that Ψ f (Z 1 ) (0, 0) ≥ 0 we have
Using the computations that led to (3.10)and (3.11) we obtain
Note that the constant ℓ 1 is independent of n. Furthermore, since the jumps of θ are of size κ 1 , the jumps of X are uniformly bounded and jumps occur only at s i , we have ∆H(t, X t )∆θ t ≤ ℓ 2 < ∞.
Combining the above estimates with the expression for wealth, we get
there exists a constant z 1 such that for any z < z 1 we will have
for all i. Thus we will have E 0,z W θ 1 ≥ n − ℓ 1 (z) − ℓ 2 , and letting n → ∞ will complete the proof.
The following theorem allows a glimpse into the optimal strategy of the insider. It shows that if the pricing rule satisfies c = j = 0, it is not optimal for the insider to use jumps. 1) )) = 1. The proof of this theorem is postponed to the Appendix. It relies on the following lemma that will also be useful in the proof of Theorem 3.4. This lemma shows that only a class of weighting functions that satisfy a further condition on g can be supported in an equilibrium. Thus it allows us to restrict the set of admissible pricing rules further. Proof. Let us first show that the existence of equilibrium implies H(t, ∞) = −H(t, −∞) = ∞ for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, if there existst such that H(t, x) ≥ h for all x ∈ R, then for all s ≤t we have H(s, x) ≥ h for all x ∈ R. This follows from the fact that Y is a Brownian motion in the market maker's filtration in equilibrium and, thus, the random variable X t has full support due to Remark 2.1. That Y is a Brownian motion is a consequence of rationality, H x > 0 and H satisfies (3.2).
However, uniform boundedness of the price from below on [0,t] gives an unbounded profit for the insider contradicting the definition of equilibrium. Indeed, since f is unbounded from below there exists a z ∈ R such that f (z) < h. Consider the trading strategy
and note that integrating by parts the associated final wealth we obtain
Therefore, we can assume that H(t, ∞) = −H(t, −∞) = ∞ for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Next denote g Hy (t, H −1 (t, x)) byg(t, x) and observe that
Suppose that for all t ∈ [0, 1] we have lim u→∞ g Hy (t, H −1 (t, u)) = lim u→∞g (t, u) ≥ 0 as well as lim u→−∞g (t, u) ≥ 0, and consider A n := {(t, u) ∈ [0, 1] × R :g(t, u) ≤ −n}. Clearly, A n is closed for each n ≥ 1. Moreover, it is also bounded. Indeed, suppose there exists a sequence (t m , u m ) m≥1 ⊂ A n such that lim m→∞ t m = t ≤ 1 and lim m→∞ u m = ∞ or −∞. Then, lim m→∞g (t m , u m ) ≥ 0 due to the joint continuity ofg, which is a contradiction. Thus A n s are compact and their intersection would be nonempty by the nested set property ifg were not bounded from below. However, if (t,û) ∈ [0, 1] × R belongs to the intersection, g(t,û) = −∞. Thus, the intersection must be empty and, therefore,g is bounded from below.
Next suppose that there exists at such that either lim u→∞g (t, u) < 0 or lim u→−∞g (t, u) < 0. Without loss of generality assume the former and observe that this leads tog(t, x) < −c for all (t, x) in [t 1 , t 2 ] × [x 1 , ∞) for some c > 0 and t 1 , t 2 in [0, 1] and x 1 ∈ R due to the joint continuity ofg. Note that x 1 can be assumed to satisfy H(t, x 1 ) ≥ f (z) for all t ∈ [t 1 , t 2 ] due to the continuity and monotonicity of H. Let x n : [0, 1] → R be the piecewise linear function defined by x n (0) = 0, x n (t 1 ) =
]. Consider ε = 1 4 and an application of Lemma A.1 yields an existence of an admissible strategy θ n that is continuous and of finite variation and satisfies
, where X n is as in the Lemma. The wealth associated with this strategy is given by
by Theorem 3.1. Since X n is uniformly bounded on [0, t 1 ] and[t 2 , 1], we only need to consider the above integral on [t 1 , t 2 ]. Moreover, continuity ofg implies H(t,X n t )
where the second and third inequality are due tog being less than or equal to −c on [
], it follows from the monotone convergence theorem that W n 1 → ∞ as n → ∞, which contradicts the definition of equilibrium.
Remark 3.2. Note that in view of the above lemma we can take H to be the identity function. Indeed, if (H, w) is a pricing rule satisfying the conditions of above lemma, then (H,w), whereH(t, x) = x andw(t, x) = H x (t, H −1 (t, x))w(t, H −1 (t, x)) is also a pricing rule satisfying the conditions of the lemma withg(t, x) = g(t,H −1 (t,x)) Hx(t,H −1 (t,x))
. Moreover,
Moreover, consider S t := H(t, X t ), where X is the unique solution of (2.7) with c = j = 0. Then
and, therefore, S satisfies (2.7) with w =w. Indeed,
The above is equivalent to
which holds in view of dynamics of X. Therefore, without loss of generality we can assume H is identity.
The following theorem provides the justification that the weighting function must satisfy the PDE (3.1) with g = 0. Assume further that there exists a set E such that Q(E) = 1 and for all z ∈ E there exists a continuous function s f (z) of finite variation such that
Proof. Note that θ * is continuous in view of Theorem 3.3. Observe that H * can be taken equal to identity in view of Remark 3.2. We will also restrict our attention to z ∈ E.
Fix z ∈ E. We show that X * must be such that X * t = arg min x x f (z) (y − f (z))g(t, y)dy for all t ∈ (0, ν). Suppose not, i.e. assume that there exists t ∈ (0, ν) and δ > 0 such that
since both X * and s f (z) are continuous on [0, ν] and
This implies
For any ε > 0 consider s ε such that s 
We will use the corresponding θ ε as the insider's strategy on [0, ν].
dt and note that X ε remains bounded on [ν, ν + ε] and X ε ν+ε = f (z). Now consider the interval [ν + ε, ν + 2ε] and introduce
with R ε ν+ε = K w (ν + ε, f (z)). It is easy to see that the solution to the above SDE on [ν + ε, ν + 2ε) is given by We shall show that the above strategy will outperform θ * for small enough ε.
, but this means that the rational pricing rule must satisfy X * s = X * t for any s ≥ t which is not consistent with the definition of the pricing rule since w > 0.
i) E t (s) is connected: Suppose a 1 , a 2 ∈ E t (s) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. We need to show that a = λa 1 + (1 − λ)a 2 ∈ E t (s). Indeed, for any r ∈ R we have: (y − a 1 )g(t, y)dy
where the last inequality is due to the fact that for i = 1, 2
This implies that r a (y − a)g(t, y)dy ≥ s a (y − a)g(t, y)dy for all r ∈ R and therefore a ∈ E t (s). ii) s ∈ E t (s) and {s} = E t (s) ⇒ g(t, y) = 0 for all y ∈ E t (s). Suppose there exist (t, s) ∈ [0, ν] × R such that: s ∈ E t (s), E t (s) = {s}, and g(t,ỹ) = 0 for somẽ y ∈ E t (s). Since s ∈ E t (s) for any r ∈ R we will have 
for any r ∈ R and some ψ ∈ [r ∧ s, r ∨ s]. Note thatỹ = s since for any a ∈ E t (s) we have s = arg min x x a (y − a)g(t, y)dy and therefore the first order conditions imply g(t, s) = 0 as we can choose a = s.
and therefore G(t, y * ) ≥ G(t, ψ). Thus, G(t, y * ) = G(t, ψ) and (3.15) implies
This yields G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [s, y * ] and in particular G(t, s) = G(t, y * ) = min y∈[s,ỹ] G(t, y). Since G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [s, y * ] and g is continuous, we have
Sinceỹ ∈ E t (s) we have
Since G is continuous it implies that G(t, y) = G(t, s) for all y ∈ [0,ỹ] which contradicts the above result that G(t, s) < G(t,ỹ). Thus, we can not haveỹ ≥ s.
and therefore G(t, y * ) ≤ G(t, ψ). Thus, G(t, y * ) = G(t, ψ) and (3.16) implies This yields G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [y * , s] and in particular G(t, s) = G(t, y * ) = max y∈[ỹ,s] G(t, y). Since G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [y * , s] and g is continuous, we have g(t, y) = 0 for y ∈ [y * , s]. Thusỹ = y * which implies G(t, s) = max y∈[ỹ,s] G(t, y) > G(t,ỹ).
Since G is continuous it implies that G(t, y) = G(t, s) for all y ∈ [0,ỹ] which contradicts the above result that G(t, s) < G(t,ỹ). Thus, there doesn't existỹ ∈ E t (s) such that g(t,ỹ) = 0.
Absolute continuity of the optimal strategy of the insider
In this section we will show that the equations (3.1)-(3.2) with g = 0 imply the insider must use continuous strategies of finite variation under a mild further condition on the pricing rule. To understand this assumption in (4.5) suppose K w (1,
(4.1) and observe that M is independent of B. We will further assume that
for some measurable processσ. This process M will be used by the insider to drive the market price to its fundamental value. Under the optimality conditions of the theorem below K w (1, H −1 (1, f (Z 1 ))) = Y 1 . Thus, M corresponds to the insider's expectation of the final total demand using her own private information only. Not using public information ensures M is independent of B.
The condition (4.5) is in fact an assumption on the quadratic variation of the signal and is satisfied in the Markovian framework employed in the earlier Kyle-Back models (see, among others, [14] , [3] , [5] , [22] , and [6] ). i.e. f (Z 1 ) is square integrable for any initial condition of Z. Let (H, w) be an admissible pricing rule satisfying (3.1) and (3.2) with g = 0. Then θ ∈ A(H, w) is an optimal strategy if i) θ is continuous and of finite variation, ii) and H(1−, X 1− ) = f (Z 1 ), P 0,z -a.s., where
Moreover, if we further assume that for some α ∈ (1, 2), then for any θ ∈ A(H, w), there exists a sequence of admissible absolutely continuous strategies, (θ n ) n≥1 , such that
Proof. In view of (3.4) and since w is positive and H is increasing, we have
Note the inequality above becomes equality if and only if ∆θ t = 0 due to the strict monotonicity of H. Moreover, Ψ f (Z 1 ) (1−, X 1− ) ≥ 0 with an equality if and only if H(1−, X 1− ) = f (Z 1 ).
Therefore, E 0,z W θ 1 ≤ E 0,z Ψ f (Z 1 ) (0, 0) for all admissible θs and equality is reached if and only if the following two conditions are met: i) θ is continuous and of finite variation.
ii) H(1−, X 1− ) = f (Z 1 ), P 0,z -a.s..
Hence, the proof will be complete if one can find a sequence of absolutely continuous admissible strategies, (θ n ) n≥1 such that lim n→∞ E 0,z W θ n 1 = E 0,z Ψ f (Z 1 ) (0, 0) . Consider the bridge process, Y , that starts at 0 and ends up at M 1 at t = 1:
It is easy to check that the above converges a.s. to M 1 using the continuity of M and L'Hospital rule since (1 − t) t 0 1 1−s dB s is the Brownian bridge from 0 to 0 as in Exercise IX.2.12 in [20] .
To establish the semimartingale property of Y first observe that
Thus, by Theorem V.1.6 in [20] , there exists a Brownian motionβ such that 
